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RETHINK “PERSONAL”:
AT&T AND THE GRAMMAR
CLAMOR AT THE COURT
Justin Dickerson*
Are corporations people, too? Several recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have considered whether constitutional protections that are
typically reserved for individuals also extend to corporations. While
corporations are considered “persons” in a legal sense, a unanimous
Court decided in FCC v. AT&T that this legal fiction does not entitle
corporations to “personal” privacy rights under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Without delving into more controversial
constitutional questions, Chief Justice Roberts reached this conclusion
largely by analyzing the ordinary and legal usages of the words
“person” and “personal.” This Comment examines the Court’s ruling
and argues that while the Court answered a specific question regarding
a corporation’s privacy rights in the context of FOIA, it missed a
valuable opportunity to further clarify how constitutional rights apply
to corporations. Indeed, despite the Court’s holding in FCC v. AT&T,
more challenges to the idea of corporate personhood will likely follow.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S., Foreign Service, May
2006, Georgetown University. Many thanks to Professor Therese Maynard and Professor Michael
Guttentag for their thoughtful comments and guidance; to the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their tireless efforts; and to my family and girlfriend, Jennifer Roth,
for their support and encouragement. I dedicate this Comment to my father, Robert Dickerson,
whose hard work, incredible achievements, and even greater humility inspire me every day.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or the “Act”) requires
federal agencies to make records and documents publicly available
upon request, unless the documents fall within one of several
statutory exemptions.1 One of these exemptions, § 552(b)(7)(C)
(“Exemption 7(C)”), covers law-enforcement records, the disclosure
of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”2 In FCC v. AT&T Inc.,3 AT&T argued
that corporations such as itself have “personal privacy” rights under
this FOIA exemption based on the common legal usage of the word
“person” to describe corporations.4
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court, held that corporations do not have a right to personal privacy
for purposes of Exemption 7(C).5 Much of the support for the
Court’s holding came from standard English dictionary definitions
and grammar.6 AT&T’s primary argument claimed that “[b]y
expressly defining the noun ‘person’ to include corporations,
Congress necessarily defined the adjective form of that noun—
‘personal’—also to include corporations.”7 Beyond the word’s
standard usage in the English language, the Court also looked to the
use of the word “personal” as it is used in the statutory context of
Exemption 7(C),8 § 552(b)(6) (“Exemption 6”),9 and § 552(b)(4)
(“Exemption 4”),10 as well as in the legislative history describing
Congress’s intentions in drafting Exemption 7(C).11 In addition, the
Court compared the language of Exemption 7(C) to the language that
is used in other FOIA exemptions, and, more specifically, considered

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1279)).
8.
9.
10.
11.

See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
Id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added).
131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1179, 1185.
See id. at 1181–84.
Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc. at 14, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (No. 09Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1184–85; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006).
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1185; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1184.
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whether the language of those other exemptions would apply to
corporations.12
This case is significant given the controversy that surrounded
the Court’s decision during the previous term in Citizens United v.
FEC,13 where the Court recognized that profit-making corporations
have a broad constitutional right of free speech.14 As it did in
Citizens United,15 the Court once again, in FCC v. AT&T, considered
the fiction of corporate “personhood.”16 In addition, FCC v. AT&T is
notable for what it did not decide; namely, it avoided any discussion
of whether another core “personal” right found in the Constitution
could also extend to corporations.
This Comment argues that the Court missed an important
opportunity to clarify how “personal” rights apply to corporations.
Part II details the facts that led to the Court’s holding. Part III then
examines AT&T’s contention that “personal” is merely the adjectival
form of “person.” It also discusses the Court’s response, which
explored the ordinary language and legal usages of these words and
provided a statutory interpretation. Part IV goes on to analyze how
the Court sidestepped a constitutional discussion by focusing on
grammar and word definitions to reach its conclusion. This Part
contrasts Exemption 7(C) with other exemptions within FOIA, and it
also discusses other landmark cases that deal with the idea of
corporate “personhood.” Finally, Part V concludes that Chief Justice
Roberts intentionally limited his analysis to avoid dealing with larger
constitutional questions, and that more challenges from corporate
“persons” are likely to follow.
II. STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
AT&T participated in an FCC-administered program called the
Education-Rate program that the FCC created to enhance schools’
and libraries’ access to advanced telecommunications and
information services.17 In August 2004, “AT&T voluntarily reported

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1184–85.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See id. at 883.
Id. at 972.
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181–84.
Id. at 1180.
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to the FCC that it might have overcharged the U.S. government for
services it provided to them as part of the program.”18 In response,
the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (the “Bureau”) launched an
investigation of AT&T.19 As part of the Bureau’s investigation,
“AT&T provided the Bureau with various documents, including [its]
responses to interrogatories, invoices, e-mails with pricing and
billing information, names and job descriptions of employees
involved, and AT&T’s assessment of whether those employees had
violated the company’s code of conduct.”20 The Bureau completed
its investigation, and the FCC and AT&T resolved the matter in
December 2004 through a consent decree in which AT&T, without
conceding liability, agreed to pay the U.S. government $500,000 and
institute a plan to ensure that AT&T would comply with the program
in the future.21
Several months after the parties entered the consent decree,
CompTel, a “trade association representing some of AT&T’s
competitors,” submitted a FOIA request for “[a]ll pleadings and
correspondence” in the Bureau’s file on its investigation of AT&T.22
AT&T opposed CompTel’s request, and the Bureau responded to
CompTel’s request with a letter ruling.23 The Bureau concluded in its
ruling that some of the information that AT&T had provided as part
of the investigation (including cost and pricing data; billing-related
information; and information that identified staff, contractors, and
customer representatives) should be protected from disclosure under
Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information” from disclosure.24 The Bureau also decided to
withhold other information that CompTel requested on the basis of
Exemption 7(C), which precludes the disclosure of “records of
information compiled for law enforcement purposes” where such
disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”25 Applying the terms of
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492–93 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
1177 (2011)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Exemption 7(C), the Bureau concluded that the individuals who were
identified in AT&T’s submissions had “privacy rights” that
warranted protection under Exemption 7(C).26 While the Bureau
extended Exemption 7(C) protection to the individuals who were
identified in AT&T’s records, the Bureau did not extend that
exemption to the corporation itself. It reasoned that “businesses do
not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests by the exemption.”27
The FCC reviewed and agreed with the Bureau’s findings.28 The
FCC disagreed with AT&T’s argument that it was a “private
corporate citizen” with personal privacy rights that needed to be
protected because disclosure would have “embarrass[ed]” the
corporation.29 The FCC found AT&T’s position to be at odds with
established FCC and judicial precedent.30 The FCC thus concluded
that Exemption 7(C)’s protection of records that it compiled for law
enforcement purposes—the disclosure of which could reasonably
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy—does not
apply to corporations such as AT&T.31
As the statute that governs review of final FCC decisions
permits,32 AT&T sought a review of the FCC’s decision in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.33 The appellate court rejected
the FCC’s reasoning, concluding that Exemption 7(C)’s protection of
personal privacy rights does extend to corporations.34 While it noted
that Congress defined the word “person” to include corporations as
well as individuals, the Third Circuit emphasized that the full text of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs how federal
administrative agencies may propose and establish regulations, states
that the term “person” includes “an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than
an agency.”35 The Third Circuit found that FOIA’s text

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re SBC Commc’ns Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (2008)).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2006).
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181.
Id.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)).
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“unambiguously” indicates that a corporation may have a personal
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).36
The FCC then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the
Third Circuit’s decision.37 CompTel filed as a respondent supporting
the FCC.38 The Court granted certiorari and then reversed the Third
Circuit’s decision on March 1, 2011.39
III. REASONING OF
THE COURT
In its appeal to the Court, AT&T reiterated the Third Circuit’s
finding that the word “personal,” as Exemption 7(C) uses it in the
sense of “personal privacy,” is merely the adjectival form of
“person.”40 The Court responded to this argument with a grammar
lesson.41 The Court said that “adjectives typically reflect the meaning
of corresponding nouns, but not always.”42
Therefore, the Court was not persuaded by AT&T’s reasoning
and offered several examples in support of its conclusion that
AT&T’s asserted “grammatical imperative” does not always mean
that Congress intended for the adjectival form of a noun to have the
same meaning as the noun.43 Chief Justice Roberts took a
particularly strong stance regarding this “grammatical imperative”
during oral argument. “I tried to sit down and come up with other
examples where the adjective was very different from the root noun,”
the Chief Justice said. “And it turns out it’s not hard at all.”44 To the
amusement of the audience, Chief Justice Roberts used the words
“craft” and “crafty” and then “squirrel and “squirrely.”45 In its ruling,
the Court also provided several examples of this grammatical rule:
36. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
37. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1177, 1181.
40. Id. at 1181.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id. Loyola Marymount University English professor Kevin Peters agreed. “That tells
me how vacant the cupboard was for better arguments,” he said. E-mail from Kevin J. Peters,
Professor of English, Loyola Marymount University, to Author (Aug. 15, 2011, 17:17 PST) (on
file with Author). Professor Peters said that it is a stretch to suggest that because a corporation is
a person it therefore has “personal” belongings. Id.
44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (No. 09-1279), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.aspx.
45. Id.
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for instance, the Court pointed out that the noun “crab” refers to a
crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed”
can refer to handwriting that is difficult to read.46 The Court intended
for its numerous examples to show that, even where there may be a
link between the noun and its adjective, the words will often have
different ordinary meanings.47 Accordingly, the Court found that the
word “personal” does not derive from the English word “person” and
that this finding highlighted the shortcomings of AT&T’s proposed
rule.48
The Court then discussed the ordinary meaning of the word
“personal.”49 The Court did this because it said that when a statute
does not define a term such as “personal,”50 the Court will give the
phrase its ordinary meaning.51 The Court noted that, as a matter of
ordinary English usage, the term “personal” usually refers to
individuals.52 “We do not usually speak of personal characteristics,
personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or
personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial
entities,” the Court wrote.53 This is despite the fact that we do speak
of corporations as “persons,” at least in the legal sense.54 While
corporations do engage in “correspondence,” exert “influence,” and
suffer “tragedies,” the Court observed that the term “personal” is not
generally used to describe these characteristics.55 The Court held
that, in ordinary usage, the term “personal” often means the opposite
of something that is related to business, and the Court drew out the

46. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181.
47. Id. at 1181–82. Another example is the adjective “cranky,” meaning a person with a
“wayward” or “capricious” temper, in comparison to the noun “crank,” which describes a
distorted or crooked angular shape. Id. at 1182.
48. Id. at 1182.
49. Id.
50. The word “personal” is not in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)
(2006).
51. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Johnson v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Gary Gutting, Corporations, People, and Truth, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG
(Oct. 12, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/corporations-peopleand-truth/ (discussing presidential hopeful Mitt Romney’s statement that “[c]orporations are
people” and affirming that corporations are “persons” in “some technical legal sense”).
55. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182.
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differences between work and personal life, work and personal
expenses, and a company’s official view and a personal opinion.56
To emphasize this point, the Court proposed a hypothetical:
suppose that a “chief executive officer of a corporation approached
the chief financial officer and said, ‘I have something personal to tell
you.’”57 Most would not assume that the CEO was about to discuss
company business.58 In further support, the Court then looked to
Webster’s dictionary for help in showing that the common meaning
of the word “personal” does not apply to corporations.59 The Court
noted that the dictionary defines “personal” as “‘[o]f [or] pertaining
to . . . the individual person or self,’ and ‘individual; private; one’s
own,’ . . . ‘[o]f or pertaining to one’s person, body, or figure.’”60 The
Court held that this could not mean corporations.61
AT&T also argued that “person” in common legal usage was
understood to include a corporation.62 “Personal,” AT&T argued,
therefore can and should have the same scope when it is applied to
corporations.63 Setting aside ordinary usage, the Court said that there
is little support for the notion that “personal” denotes corporations in
the legal context.64 Although AT&T had noted that corporations are
protected by the doctrine of “personal” jurisdiction, the Court held
that the phrase instead refers to jurisdiction in personam (as opposed
to in rem) not to the jurisdiction “of a person.”65
AT&T also cited an 1896 case that referred to the “personal
privilege” of a corporation.66 But the Court found that this one case
fell very short of establishing that “personal” has a legal meaning
that is separate from its ordinary meaning, even if “person” has a
legal meaning.67
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Another example that the Court gave was where a corporation is responding to a
request for information. Id. The Court said that an individual might respond, “That’s personal.”
Id. By contrast, a company spokesman, when asked for information about a company, would not
classify confidential information as “personal.” Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 726 (1933)).
61. Id. at 1183.
62. Id. at 1182.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1183.
65. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 7, at 19–20).
66. Id. (citing Mercantile Bank v. Tenn. ex. rel. Memphis, 161 U.S. 161, 171 (1896)).
67. Id.
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The Court then addressed AT&T’s argument that the term
“personal privacy” simply means the privacy of a “person” as the
statute defines it, an assertion that placed significance on the
meaning of the term “person” as Exemption 7(C) uses it.68 Once
again, the Court had a number of examples to show that “two words
together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in
isolation.”69 As such, the phrase “personal privacy” conveys more
than just the privacy “of a person,” the Court said.70 Instead, the
Court found that “personal privacy” refers to a type of privacy that is
related to human concerns and therefore not a kind of privacy that is
usually associated with a corporation like AT&T.71 The Court noted
that, although AT&T repeatedly made the argument that “personal
privacy” applies to corporations, AT&T could not support that
assertion with a single instance in which a statute, the Supreme
Court, or any other court72 expressly referred to a corporation’s
“personal privacy.”73 The Court cited a number of treatises that state
the opposite—that corporations do not have personal privacy
rights.74
Finally, the Court concluded by establishing that its analytical
approach was consistent with a longstanding approach to statutory
interpretation and that the various government agencies that apply
FOIA had long interpreted Exemption 7(C)’s personal privacy
protections to not cover corporations.75 The Court said that shortly
after Congress enacted the 1974 amendments that created
Exemption 7(C), the attorney general issued a memorandum to
executive departments and agencies in which he explained what
“personal privacy” meant as that term was used in the context of the

68. Id.
69. Id. For example, the Court said that it understands that a “golden cup” is a cup made of
or resembling gold, but a “‘golden boy,’ on the other hand, is one who is charming, lucky, and
talented. A ‘golden opportunity’ is one not to be missed.” Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. This did not include the Third Circuit’s holding in this case. See supra notes 33–36 and
accompanying text.
73. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1183.
74. Id. at 1183–84 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1976);
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 641–42 (2d ed. 1955)).
75. Id. at 1185.
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new exemption.76 The attorney general explained that personal
privacy “pertains to the privacy interests of individuals.”77
Accordingly, the attorney general noted that the new exemption
“does not seem applicable to corporations or other entities.”78 The
Court said that it had previously relied on the attorney general’s
memorandum as a “reliable guide in interpreting [the language of]
FOIA” and that it agreed with the memorandum’s interpretation of
the language of Exemption 7(C).79 The Court reversed the Third
Circuit’s judgment that Exemption 7(C)’s “personal privacy”
protection extends to corporations.80
IV. ANALYSIS
FCC v. AT&T continues the debate over the nature and extent of
a corporation’s “personhood.” However, the Court’s opinion sheds
little light on the fundamental question of just how much of a
“person” a corporation is. In addition, this decision is hard to
reconcile with Citizens United; the Citizens United Court was willing
to give a corporation the rights of a “person” in the context of the
First Amendment, but this Court was unwilling to recognize that a
corporation as a “person” has “personal privacy” rights.81
Unfortunately, after the decision in FCC v. AT&T, a corporation
as a “person” becomes an even more muddled legal construct. This is
because Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in FCC v. AT&T studiously
avoided tackling the larger issue of corporate “personhood” and its
constitutional implications: “[T]his case does not call [for the Court]
to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter
of constitutional or common law.”82 But that is not necessarily the
case. Aside from the fact that the Court could have provided more
guidance if it had tackled these issues, the case actually raises more
questions about what, if any, “personal” protections a corporation

76. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974
AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 9 (1975), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/74agmemo.htm).
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1185–86.
81. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Corporate “Personhood”—Again,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2011, 11:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=112301.
82. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1184.
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deserves. The Court only chose to answer a specific question
regarding a corporation’s privacy rights in the context of FOIA, and
missed a valuable opportunity to further clarify how constitutional
rights apply to corporations.
To avoid discussing these issues, Chief Justice Roberts focused
on the grammatical structure of Exemption 7(C)’s language as the
basis for his construing of the statute’s use of the term “personal
privacy” and his application of it to corporations. This analytical
approach is not surprising given both the Justices’ fundamental
disagreement about the proper method of interpreting statutory
language83 and Chief Justice Roberts’s fondness for “dictionaries,
derivations, grammatical parsing, and fine points of usage.”84
A. Ordinary and Legal Usages
of “Person” and “Personal”
Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to grapple mostly
with whether the ordinary and legal usages of the words “person”
and “personal” would justify extending Exemption 7(C)’s “personal
privacy” protection to corporations, rather than the constitutional
implications of doing so. During oral argument, the government
argued that the word “personal,” standing alone, refers exclusively to
human beings.85 Dictionaries, on the other hand, define “personal”
more broadly, using slight variations of the following: “of, pertaining
to, or coming as from a particular person.”86
Despite Congress’s definition of the term “person” to include a
corporation, AT&T was unable to persuade the Court that the term
“personal” has its own legal meaning that is separate from its
ordinary meaning. Moreover, AT&T provided no other support for
its “grammatical imperative” beyond the 1896 Mercantile case,

83. Denniston, supra note 81.
84. Garrett Epps, Chief Justice John Roberts: Word Nerd, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2011,
5:46 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/chief-justice-john-roberts-wordnerd/71902/. Roberts “incessantly picked at the prose diction” of other officials and those who
wrote to the president when he worked in the Reagan White House. Id. He once critiqued a letter
from three District of Columbia officials as “reading as if it were an awkward translation from
Bulgarian.” Id.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 3.
86. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1307 (2010); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1311 (4th ed. 2006); THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1982);
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (1986).
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which referred to a corporation’s “personal privilege.”87 Mercantile,
however, was not dispositive because it did not define what it means
for a corporation to have a “personal privilege” and because it only
applied the term “personal privilege” narrowly in the context of an
exemption to a federal tax statute.88
B. “Personal Privacy” as
Applied to Corporations
To prevail, AT&T had to persuade the Court that it could apply
the larger idea of “personal privacy” as a whole to corporations. But
AT&T again was unable to present any convincing evidence in
support of this assertion; rather, it argued that nothing in the statute’s
language shows that Exemption 7(C) was intended to exclude
corporations.89 This was not an effective approach, according to legal
analysts: “As the reader of the [FCC v. AT&T] opinion works
through it, the document turns into a somewhat repetitive recitation
of the theme that the notion of ‘personal privacy’ just does not seem
to fit a corporation.”90
This idea came up during the oral argument as well. The
government argued that a corporation’s privacy is more often
referred to as “confidentiality” or “secrecy.”91 Chief Justice Roberts
attempted to rebut this argument by suggesting that a corporation
does not have “confidential” or “secret” property, but rather “private
property.”92 The government argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s
examples were not situations that involved “privacy” that would fit
into the statutory language of Exemption 7(C) or within the intent
that Congress had when it adopted Exemption 7(C).93
Once again, AT&T could not identify any instances in which a
court or a statute has referred to a corporation’s personal privacy.
This was likely because the idea that “personal privacy” rights do not
apply to corporations was explicitly established even before
Congress drafted Exemption 7(C). The Court noted that William
87. See Mercantile Bank v. Tenn. ex rel. Memphis, 161 U.S. 161, 171 (1896).
88. Id.
89. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 34.
90. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A Word Game over “Privacy,” SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2011,
12:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=114729.
91. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Prosser wrote in his 1955 treatise that “[a] corporation . . . can have
no personal privacy . . . .”94 The Court also pointed out that Prosser
wrote in his later 1964 treatise that “it seems generally agreed that
the right of privacy is one pertaining only to individuals, and that a
corporation . . . cannot claim it as such.”95 In addition, the Court
noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts—though it was written
after Exemption 7(C) was drafted—stated that “[a] corporation . . .
has no personal right of privacy.”96 Thus, the Court was unable to
find any basis for AT&T’s argument that the “personal privacy”
clause of Exemption 7(C) applies to corporations. While individuals’
privacy rights have generally increased since the publication of
Prosser’s torts treatises, the Court found no proposition to suggest
that a corporation’s “personal” rights have also expanded.
C. Exemption 7(C) Contrasted
with Exemptions 4 and 6
The Court’s unwillingness to justify “personal privacy” rights
for corporations based on case law or Exemption 7(C) becomes even
more clear when one contrasts Exemption 7(C) with FOIA’s other
sections—in particular, Exemption 4 and Exemption 6. Exemption 6
allows the withholding of “personnel and medical files,” the
disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of “personal
privacy.”97 Exemption 4 pertains to “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.”98
While the Court has not yet decided whether corporations are
entitled to “personal privacy” rights under the Constitution, it could
have inferred in this case that Exemption 6’s personal privacy
protections apply only to individuals and only to protect an
individual human’s right of privacy.99 Moreover, Congress did not
use language in Exemption 7(C) that was similar to the language that
it used in Exemption 4. This suggests that Exemption 4 specifically
94. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing PROSSER,
supra note 74, § 97, at 641–42).
95. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 843–44 (3d ed. 1964)).
96. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1976)).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006).
98. Id. § 552(b)(4).
99. See Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175 (1991) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)); Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
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addresses a corporation’s “personal privacy” concerns—which are
related to its trade secrets and privileged or confidential
information—while Congress enacted Exemption 7(C) to protect a
human’s “personal privacy.”
If it had compared Exemption 7(C) to Exemption 4, the Court
also should have found that corporations do have “privileged or
confidential” kinds of information rather than “personally private”
information. Thus, at the time that Congress enacted
Exemption 7(C), FOIA already contained an exemption in
Exemption 4 that would have prevented the disclosure of a
corporation’s proprietary commercial and financial information. The
existence of Exemption 4 also shows that Congress most likely
enacted Exemption 7(C) to protect natural persons and that the use of
the term “person” cannot extend to corporations for the purposes of
Exemption 7(C).
Nonetheless, AT&T claimed in its oral argument that
Exemption 4 may not be a sufficient shield to protect a corporation’s
privileged information.100 For example, AT&T argued that
Exemption 4 would not adequately safeguard negative e-mails
between officers of a corporation about a would-be regulator or
about an important customer101: Exemption 4 would allow the
release of the damaging e-mails with the names of the parties
redacted.102 AT&T maintained that this would be an instance where
the communicating parties had an expectation of privacy that their emails would not become public and harm their corporation.103 AT&T
argued that corporations should benefit from Exemption 7(C)’s
“personal privacy” protections in situations such as one in which
they hope to prevent the release of their internal e-mails.104 Justice
Scalia seemed unconvinced based on his questions at oral
argument,105 and AT&T’s argument is especially hard to justify in
today’s world, where electronic communications—even ones where

100. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 30–31; see also supra text accompanying
note 24 (discussing Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information” from disclosure).
101. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 24–25.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 24–25.
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id. at 24 (questioning how the risk of possible embarrassment to a corporation relates to
a corporation’s “privacy” interests).
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there is an expectation of privacy—are becoming increasingly
public.
D. Larger Constitutional Questions
and Legislative History
Still, even after it heard these arguments in favor of personal
privacy protections for corporations, the Court had some discretion
to consider broader constitutional questions about the rights of
corporations. But it avoided tackling any of the points that might
show how a corporation is like a person in the privacy sense. The
Justices cited Citizens United and the Third Circuit decision in this
case, which held that corporations, like human beings, are capable of
being publicly embarrassed, harassed, or stigmatized.106 The Court
also did not look to FOIA’s general aims or consider how FOIA’s
personal privacy protections could cover a corporation. FOIA’s
overall goal is to provide disclosure except when an agency that
seeks to withhold records can prove that nondisclosure would fall
within the specific exemptions that Congress wrote into the law.107
The Court could have at least considered whether disclosure was
appropriate within the larger context of FOIA’s purpose.
AT&T asserted that corporations have had privacy rights for
decades, even rights similar to those that are typically reserved for
natural persons.108 The Court even acknowledged that corporations
can be like individuals in a way. Near the end of his opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts reflected that he “trusts” that AT&T will not take the
holding “personally.”109 In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to
be suggesting, in direct contravention of his holding, that
corporations do have “feelings” that can be hurt.
Beyond this, other than considering the attorney general’s 1975
memorandum110 regarding the newly enacted FOIA exemptions, the
Court did not delve further into the legislative history of the Act.
Justice Scalia noted during oral argument that the exceptions to
FOIA should be narrowly construed, but the Court otherwise refused

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Denniston, supra note 81.
See id.
See id.
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76.
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to acknowledge either side’s argument about what the Act plainly
means.111
On the other hand, this oversight was likely because FOIA does
not define “personal privacy,” so the Court’s best resource for its
interpretation of the Act was the attorney general’s memorandum. In
addition, as the attorney general prepared the memorandum for the
purpose of explaining the new exemptions to executive departments
and agencies,112 and because the memorandum so clearly stated that
“personal privacy” pertains to individuals,113 the Court probably did
not need to go any further into the legislative history.
Furthermore, there is a “debate within the Court as to whether it
is proper for the Justices to examine the drafting and legislative
history of a statute it is interpreting,” which may also explain its
decision to use the memorandum as the sole basis of its analysis of
the legislative history.114
In general, Chief Justice Roberts avoided the larger questions of
policy or jurisprudence and did not even hint that he knew what—or
who—the statute was meant to protect.115 If he had done any more
analysis on this point, the Chief Justice may have opened the
floodgates to many other issues that he did not want or need to
address. After all, some Justices, such as Scalia, insist that the Court
find the meaning of a federal statute in the law’s actual language,
while others, like Breyer, think that evidence of Congress’s intent
from debates and committee reports lends meaning to statutes.116
E. Citizens United and
Other Ramifications
Chief Justice Roberts also went out of his way to make clear that
this statutory decision does not provide any guidance on how far the
Court is willing to carry the Citizens United principle that
corporations have free speech rights that are as extensive as those of
individuals.117 He likely made this point because of the widespread
negative reaction to the Citizens United decision, which included a
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 11.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76.
Id.
See Denniston, supra note 81.
Epps, supra note 84.
Denniston, supra note 81.
Epps, supra note 84.
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public chastisement from President Obama.118 Then again, the Court
often repeats its command that it should not decide constitutional
issues unless it has no other alternative.119 However, there were
plenty of language-based routes that the Court could have taken to
reach its desired holding without having to tackle larger
constitutional implications.120
The Court also may have avoided the larger issue of corporate
personhood because, even in Citizens United, the majority and
dissent had different ideas about what a corporation is.121 The
majority viewed the corporation as an “association of citizens,” while
the dissent viewed corporations as more of a “creature of the
state.”122 This disagreement does not provide a helpful basis for an
analysis of whether the notion of personal privacy covers
corporations.
Despite rendering a thorough decision on the points that related
to grammar and FOIA’s exemptions, the Court failed to consider
some points that could have ramifications for FOIA’s future. The
Court could have noted that “[c]orporations with a privacy interest
under Exemption 7(C) could be more willing to participate in
government investigations.”123 It also failed to note the possibility
that the Third Circuit’s decision could hinder journalists’ ability to
obtain information from the government.124 Furthermore, because
this case was limited to Exemption 7(C) and did not state that
corporations constitutionally do not have a personal privacy interest
118. Robert Barnes, In the Court of Public Opinion, No Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
2010, at A01; Denniston, supra note 81. Near the end of his January 2010 State of the Union
address, President Obama said, “With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that, I believe, will open the floodgates for special
interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our elections.” President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
119. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003,
1004 (1994). The “last resort rule” mandates that a federal court abstain from ruling on a
constitutional issue if the case can be resolved through a nonconstitutional basis. Id.
120. Denniston, supra note 81.
121. Stefan J. Padfield, Does the Freedom of Information Act’s Protection for “Personal
Privacy” Protect the Privacy of Corporate Entities?, 38 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 156, 158
(2011).
122. Id.
123. Maeve E. Huggins, Comment, Don’t Take It Personally: Supreme Court Finds
Corporations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 481,
508 (2011).
124. Id.
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under another FOIA exemption, corporations are likely to find other
ways to assert rights to personal privacy.125 This will remain a
difficult area for the Court because the law on the one hand treats
corporations as “persons” in a legal sense, but on the other hand
recognizes that privacy remains a concept that makes the most sense
in the context of individuals’ rights.126 Thus, even if the Court
expands the “personhood” of corporations, it is likely to remain
unwilling to recognize the same level of privacy protections for
corporations as it recognizes for individuals.127
V. CONCLUSION
By apparently limiting its holding in FCC v. AT&T to FOIA
Exemption 7(C), the Court did not provide further clarification on
the “personhood” of corporations or what constitutional rights
corporations should enjoy. FCC v. AT&T provided only a thorough
grammatical and statutory analysis of FOIA’s Exemption 7(C). And
Chief Justice Roberts intentionally limited his opinion to the
conclusion that corporations, though they are “persons” in a legal
sense, do not have “personal privacy” rights based on the ordinary
usage of that term. As a result, other cases that test the full extent of
a corporation’s “personhood” are likely to follow.

125. Id. at 513.
126. Id. at 514.
127. See id.

